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THE WINNER’S CURSE: PREMATURE 






During the 1990s the NAFTA has stimulated a process of financial integration 
which was not properly anticipated at the beginning of the decade or 
regulated under the treaty arrangement.  The secular process of private sector 
currency substitution (‘dollarisation’) stimulated by successive financial 
shocks now poses serious challenges for the conduct of North American 
monetary policy. Although the monetary calculus for a potential dollar area 
yields a positive outcome for peripheral members, historical experience 
suggests that the asymmetric impact of external shocks will require specific 
arrangements to contain the economic and social results.  Further, the 
consequences of currency unification for capital markets under the gold 
standard, the sterling area, currency boards and the euro-zone have all meant 
that inter-governmental agreements for liquidity provision and prudential 
regulation have become necessary. This is the ‘winner’s curse’: the success of 
North American market integration is necessarily leading to a degree of 
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The progress of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) since its inception 
in 1994 has considerable implications for Latin American economic integration as a 
whole.  Over half of all intra-regional trade within Latin America is with Mexico, 
while Mexico also accounts for over half of the trade between the US and Latin 
America. Mexico is the destination for most US investment in the region, and the 
origin of the bulk of immigration - both legal and illegal.  NAFTA also represents a 
new standard for integration initiatives, particularly for those between developed and 
developing countries; and has had a profound effect on the design of multilateral trade 
and investment treaties. The three NAFTA countries now account for nearly a quarter 
of world trade; while trade between its members represents 40 percent of their total 
trade. 
 
The NAFTA also represents a major departure in the economic and institutional 
relationship between the United States and the other nations of the Americas. On the 
one hand, it involves an explicit commitment to market integration - not only in goods 
but also in services and capital markets - with significant additional agreements in 
employment and environmental standards. On the other hand, NAFTA appears to 
involve an implicit step back from the traditional US commitment to multilateral 
agreements on free trade and open capital markets on a global scale – and possibly 
even a retreat into a regional trade and currency zone.   
 
The first seven years of NAFTA have seen not only a rapid trade expansion between 
the partners but also a major financial crisis in Mexico. While the US administration 
has been willing to support the Mexican economy in crisis, very little institutional 
change has taken place in order to reflect the real degree of economic integration 
between the two countries. This policy of ‘benign neglect’ seems to have been 
justified in the case of commodity trade: the NAFTA passed a major ‘stress test’ in 
the form of a major peso devaluation in 1995 and a subsequent import surge into the 
US, without serious protective reaction. Although trade remains seriously unbalanced 
and the export of services such as road transport is still constrained by state-level 
restrictions, the periodic inter-governmental meetings seem capably of handling 
differences in an effective manner and furthering the integration process.  
 
The same cannot be said of financial policy, where both the scale and direction of 
flows and the institutional arrangements are highly problematic, in view of the 
potential for macroeconomic disruption caused by periodic monetary crises. The 
increasing dollarisation of the Mexican economy and the exogenous nature of capital 
flows have severely reduced the capacity of domestic authorities to stabilise the 
economy. The need for greater understanding of the implications of the use of the 
dollar for the Mexican economy is evident. However, this is not just a matter of 
monetary cost-benefit in terms of seignorage loss and lower interest rates; or even 
only an issue of increased credibility and loss of adjustment capacity. The central 
issue is in fact the nature of the institutional arrangements that underpin any currency 
system – particularly the provision of liquidity and the regulation of capital markets.  
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This paper sets out to address this issue by examining a range of historical models for 
the use of an ‘external currency’ and then applying their implications for monetary 
relations between Mexico and the USA in the NAFTA context.  Part 2 defines the 
nature of currency substitution, looks at some evidence on the use of the dollar and 
the peso, and sketches the main elements of the current debate on dollarisation in the 
region. The lessons of the gold standard and more recent currency board (‘dollar 
standard’) systems of apparently ‘unmanaged’ use of external money are drawn in 
Part 3. These suggest that last resort lending and supervisory co-ordination are still 
required except in special cases such as Panama. In Part 4 the post-WWII sterling area 
and the Franc Zone on the one hand, and the European Monetary Union on the other, 
are examined as examples of ‘managed’ external currency systems with varying 
degrees of participation by the member countries. Despite the provision of liquidity 
the need for common fiscal rules and the problem of asymmetric response to 
exogenous shocks are evident.  
 
In Part 5 of this paper these two strands are brought together to provide an assessment 
of the monetary options available to Mexico, suggesting that membership of an 
extended Federal Reserve system would be both feasible and preferable in economic 
terms. However, the political economy considerations mentioned in the concluding 
Part 6 seem to imply that the institutional implications of further monetary co-
operation may be unacceptable. This the ‘winner’s curse’: the success of North 
American market integration is itself leading to a degree of institutional co-operation 






2. FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN MEXICO AND 
THE USA 
 
Market integration lies at the heart of the explanation for the growth in both Mexican 
exports and imports. This might seem surprising under the conditions of currency 
volatility, which is why the increasing dollarisation of the private sector may be 
related to trade expansion. The dollarisation of the Mexican economy is evident, but 
difficult to measure, for two reasons. The first, and most obvious, is that the use of the 
dollar as currency in circulation within Mexico is not registered by either monetary 
authority; while Mexican assets in Mexico tend to be under-reported for fiscal 
reasons. The second, and possibly more important reason is because money does not 
just act as a means of exchange and store of value, but also as a unit of account. In 
other words, most large contracts and transactions in Mexico are now carried out 
implicitly in dollars, and peso prices will be varied automatically with the exchange 
rate – except of course wages.  
 
 
   4
The literature
2 makes an important distinction between: (a) ‘normal’ currency 
substitution based on the services supplied by both currencies and the risks of parity 
shift (including risk aversion), in other words a risk/return motive for holding assets 
and transactions motives; and (b) ‘pathological’ currency substitution based on 
uncertainty and a change in expectations thereof. Normal substitution can take place 




This leaves ‘pathological’ substitution essentially undefined. In the case of Mexico at 
least, a more convincing explanation might be that dollarisation is the path-dependent 
consequence of four factors: 
(a) cumulative macroeconomic shocks leading to asset composition changes as 
wealth-holders (firms, banks and rich households) hedge their positions; 
(b) reduced costs of dealing in foreign assets and liabilities, due to technological 
change, capital account liberalisation and the experience of doing so; 
(c) fear of continued macro-shocks of the ‘new’ type; 
(d) the transnationalisation of households themselves, in the form of migration 
(and remittances) for the poor, and reliance on education, health and consumer 
goods from the US (requiring large balances there) in the case of richer 
households.  
 
The official estimate of the extent of dollarisation (see Table 3 below) in Mexico is 
that no more than 7 percent of total money supply is in dollar form in 1999, with a 
peak at 27 percent in 1994.
4  However, if to this ‘dollar-M4’ we add the US bank 
deposits and securities holdings by Mexican residents recorded by the US Treasury 
(see Table 4) then the figure is closer to 20 percent in 1999 with a peak of 44 percent 
in 1994. Vanderbeele (2000) carries out tests for the degree of dollarisation in Mexico 
since 1980 under this wider definition.  Structural factors such as trade integration and 
regulatory changes explain the dollarisation trend over the long term, while 
‘pathological’ factors such as exchange rate expectations and hysterisis are also 
present, especially during crisis periods. None the less, structural factors determine 
changes in the parameters of the money services function and have altered the 
substitutability of both currencies and thus the elasticity of currency substitution. 
 
However, there is good reason to believe that dollarisation is much more extensive in 
Mexico than these figures indicates. The recorded holdings of US securities seem 
much too low in view of at least two decades of capital flight, while there is no 
estimate of dollars in the hands of the Mexican public. The implicit portfolio balance 
between US bank deposits and securities seems implausible. If we allow for some 
US$ 10 bn in securities (rather than the $ 1 bn recorded) plus a further $ 5 bn for 
circulating currency (the reserve money in pesos is equivalent to $20bn), then the true 
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‘dollar money supply’ available to Mexican residents would be of the order of one-
third of the dollar equivalent of the domestic money supply.  
 
The main concern in the early literature in the ‘monetary approach to the balance of 
payments’ tradition was the effect of currency substitution in reducing the 
effectiveness of monetary policy.  This argument was then developed in order to 
explain the lack of effect of monetary expansion on the exchange rate: increased 
money supply was held to lead to increased currency substitution. Mundell (1961) 
also stresses the importance of factor mobility (both labour and capital) as a shock 
absorber within a currency are even if production structures are not symmetrical; this 
mobility can compensate for the loss of the exchange rate instrument.  Mexico would 
clearly qualify here. Wage flexibility will also be important insofar as labour cannot 
move freely.  Over the crisis, real wages fell by some 30%, similar to the real 
exchange rate adjustment. Openness of the economy is also held to be important 
(McKinnon, 1963), and would clearly be a positive factor for Mexico. 
 
However, the experience of EMU has raised a number of other factors, particularly 
the credibility of exchange rate arrangements and time-inconsistency in governments’ 
fiscal and monetary policy. Countries with similar economic structures are held to 
respond similarly to shocks (whether trade or financial) then symmetrical (ie 
common) responses will be appropriate. If structures are different, then disturbances 
will be asymmetrical and the policy response should be asymmetric too. Further, with 
a dominant economy (eg US) in the currency area, shocks will be transmitted to the 
other members (eg Mexico) rather than the other way around.  
 
In contrast, the need for similar inflation rates (eg EMU convergence criteria) is 
clearly not met at present; although it should be noted that high-inflation countries can 
converge very rapidly under a credible currency conversion - as the Argentine 
experience indicates.   Finally, fiscal integration is held to be important (eg replacing 
devaluation by transfers for adjustment, tax harmonisation etc) but there is little or no 
prospect of this. In consequence, currency union would force adjustment back on real 
wages, unemployment and public expenditure. This may seem regressive, but of 
course in a semi-dollarised economy devaluation has any asymmetric effect in any 
case – benefiting those with dollar assets and prejudicing those paid in pesos. 
 
The function and power of the central bank are clearly undermined by dollarisation. 
As the central bank cannot issue the external currency, the domestic money supply is 
no longer a policy instrument and the economy may be forced to operate without as a 
‘lender of last resort’(Caprio, 1996). Banks lose asset value during crises, but retain 
their liabilities; so LLR is brought in to transfer wealth to depositors/creditors. Some 
access to assets, tax receipts, credit lines or the issue of currency/reserves must be 
available to the LLR in order to buy assets at prices which the market considers 
unrealistic at the time. As these crises usually involve a shortage of liquidity and the 
central bank creates this, the LLR function is typically assigned to the central bank.  
 
However, this function can be carried out by other actors with access to external funds 
who can make corresponding asset purchases: the government (the treasury or even an 
agency such as the state pension fund); another central bank; or even the private 
sector – typically the head offices of banks with branches or subsidiaries in the host 
country.    6
Dollarisation of the private sector would eliminate exchange rate risk, and thus one of 
the major causes of liquidity crises (from attacks on the exchange rate affecting 
institutions with unhedged balance sheets) and bank runs. It does not, however, 
eradicate credit risk or the effect of exogenous interest rate (or price) shocks. 
 
However, as Calvo and Veigh (1992) point out, continued fiscal imbalances may 
force the private banks to lend to the government and to those previously relying on 
liquidity provision, which increases their bad loan book and then causes bank runs. A 
high interest-rate T-Bill market as an alternative ‘solution’ to the fiscal problem leads 
to longer-term solvency problems and causes the banks to disintermediate.






3. USING AN ‘EXTERNAL MONEY’: THE GOLD STANDARD AND CURRENCY BOARDS 
 
The ‘classical’ gold standard system that operated between 1870 and 1913 was, for 
the participating countries, an apparent equivalent to moving to a ‘dollar standard’ 
today. Participating countries declared parities against gold, with implicit cross-rates 
to be enforced by arbitrage in bullion. Capital controls were largely absent, and 
although governments did try to influence international lending levels, they had little 
information on their balance of payments position and thus could not target the 
current account.  In fact, capital flows were very large relative to the size of national 
economies and their mutual trade during this period. There was also a remarkable co-
movement of domestic prices between the leading economies during this period, 
including long episodes of deflation, due mainly to the flexibility of nominal wages 
and a large pool of reserve labour. Long-term interest rates were remarkably stable 
and converged gradually to the 3-4 percent range, due not only to the gold and capital 
arbitrage but also to increasing confidence that the system would be maintained.
6  
 
During the Great War the system broke down, and although it returned in the mid-
1920s it proved unsustainable as persistent payments imbalances threatened to 
exhaust the reserves of deficit countries and deflationary pressures worsened 
unemployment and augmented the burden of mortgage debts.
7  In this inter-war 
period it was the ‘periphery’ – that is, Latin America and the Dominions - that was 
most seriously affected. Argentina and Uruguay suspended payments in 1929, while 
Canada introduced monetary restrictions equivalent to devaluation. Brazil, Chile, 
Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Australia and New Zealand all suspended gold 
convertibility, and their currencies immediately fell below par.  
 
Thus although the gold standard system did stabilise exchange rates and had a 
dramatic effect on balance of payments deficits, it did not engender much stability in 
domestic variables such as money supply or growth or employment. In consequence, 
it failed to stabilise price levels and real interest rates – in other words, output and 
                                                           
5 This was the result of the currency board system in Argentina during the 1990s, where the 
government was forced to abroad not only to cover its own fiscal deficits but also in order to provide 
liquidity to the banks, leading  eventually to debt insolvency and an IMD bailout in 2000. 
6 Eichengreen, 1994. 
7 Eichengreen, 1992.   7
employment were unnecessarily sacrificed to external equilibrium.
8  It is also evident 
that the gold specie flows, through which adjustment was to take place in principle, 
were quite low compared to the balance of payments adjustments that took place. In 
practice, the adjustment mechanisms were a combination of Keynesian output shifts 
and trade multipliers on the one hand, and large capital flows between banking centres 
and participating countries on the other. 
 
The gold standard system was of considerable advantage to the ‘core countries’ (UK 
and France) which managed the system, as the world’s capital markets were thus in 
London and Paris, with depth on which their governments could borrow cheaply and 
massively.
9 They could also use this dominance in order to influence the policies of 
smaller European and other peripheral countries. The two central banks intervened 
heavily in the market to stop volatility; they issued government bonds to bolster their 
reserves, which were always low, and cooperated closely – both before 1913 and 
more intensely after 1919.
10  However, the system relied extensively on private banks 
such as Rothschilds using their gold balances as the two central banks never had 
sufficient gold and in particular to support the Bank of England and the Bank of 
France in the 1907 crisis.
11 The point here is that private capital flows were not 
entirely guided by immediate arbitrage gains, but by the longer-term advantages to 
large banks of supporting international monetary stability. 
 
The adoption of the gold standard by the industrialised countries meant that Latin 
America did not have to balance bilateral trade: exports to the US which were used to 
pay for imports from Europe until the breakdown of the gold standard in 1913 lead to 
severe disruption.
12  On independence Latin America had inherited a motley 
circulation of silver and gold coin; and the decline of silver prices after 1870 left those 
countries that were not on the gold standard on a de facto silver standard. As this 
latter became indefensible so they retreated onto paper money. However, subsequent 
inflation led to most countries attempting to get onto the gold standard by the end of 
the century, even though many did not have sufficient gold reserves. Argentina, Brazil 
and Chile solved this problem by collecting taxes in gold and entered early. Others - 
Costa Rica, Ecuador and Peru – had hardly joined by 1913, while Caribbean countries 
adopted the dollar instead. However, rising commodity prices during the pre-war 
decades meant that lack of export competitiveness was not a general problem. Where 
domestic inflation in non-traded sectors affected costs, tariffs were often used to 
achieve effective devaluation.  
 
The Great War meant the end of the gold standard system and the movement of 
capital, leading to suspension of convertibility and wholesale debt default. However, 
even in the classical period, the way in which the gold standard (supposedly) operated 
                                                           
8 See Hallwood and MacDonald (1994), Chapter 13.  
9 Note that the main source of fiscal deficits then was military, not social expenditure.  
10 “The biggest difference between the pre-1914 gold standard and the old exchange system of the 
1920s was that two of the most important players – the United States and France – bent the rules by 
sterilising additions to their reserves in order to avoid domestic inflation. Without central bank co-
operation, the system could not survive.” (Furguson 1998, II, 462) 
11 Indeed as early as 1825 the Bank of England itself was bailed out by Rothschilds (Ferguson, 1998: I, 
136). Rothschilds became involved in forcing stabilisation policies on Brazil throughout the nineteenth 
century, including large coffee purchases (II:346-7); gold mining for supply in South Africa and gold 
price ‘fixing’ (Furguson II 352-3). 
12 See Bulmer-Thomas ( 1994).   8
between industrialised economies was not really relevant to Latin America. Balance 
of payments difficulties arose from terms of trade shocks rather than fiscal 
imbalances, and could not be corrected by relative price shifts domestically in order to 
promote exports. Any inflow of gold after export price rises led inevitably to 
unsustainable import levels. Thus even in the classical gold standard period, Latin 
America tended to suspend convertibility in periods of gold outflow.   
 
During the 1920s, some countries adopted gold standard for the first time (eg Bolivia) 
and others returned (including Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) precisely because of the 
automatic stabiliser it provided.
13 However the decline in exports was so severe after 
1929 that gold reserves evaporated and three countries (Argentina, Mexico and 
Uruguay) suspended the gold standard before the British decision to stop selling gold 
and foreign exchange on demand in 1931.  Most countries introduced exchange 
controls and rationed imports until forced off the standard by US suspension in 1933. 
The result was relatively positive because declining fiscal receipts from trade duties 
led to expansionary monetary stances, which stimulated domestic demand and 




In contrast, Australia and Canada stayed on the gold standard without excessive strain 
between 1890 and 1913. Unlike Latin America, Australia and Canada had no 
independent monetary authorities and thus could neither play by ‘the rules of the 
game’ or break them. As neither Dominion could sterilise capital flows, it was the 
international mobility of capital rather than adherence to gold standard rules as such 
which made the system work smoothly.
15 This may suggest that Argentine being 
driven off the gold standard in the 1890s while Australia was not, despite its 
depression in that same period for much the same reason, was due to sustained capital 
market access. This access in turn can be seen as a reputational benefit of credible 
membership of the sterling-gold zone derived from Dominion status, which made exit 
more difficult and ensured support from London. 
 
Currency boards may appear to provide a modern parallel to the gold standard system 
based on the dollar or a basket of international currencies. Although the domestic 
money supply is no longer a policy instrument in the sense of being linked to the 
external reserve position, there is no open access to foreign money. There is no 
official lender of last resort (LLR) in the form of a central bank under a currency 
board system.
16  However, in practice other actors with access to external funds can 
make the corresponding asset purchases: the government (the treasury or an agency 
such as the state pension fund); another central bank; or even the private sector (head 
offices of banks with branches or subsidiaries in the host country). This tends to cause 
                                                           
13 Diaz-Fuentes (1999). 
14 See Thorp (1984).  
15 Dick, Floyd and Pope (1996) use a portfolio model of balance of payments adjustment that treats 
asset markets in a world-wide general equilibrium framework with imperfect capital mobility, which 
gives a better understanding of the way in which the gold standard really worked than the price-specie-
flow mechanism of adjustment espoused by Taussig and Viner. 
16 Banks lose asset value during crises, but retain their liabilities; so a lender of last resort (LLR) is 
brought in to transfer wealth to depositors/creditors. Access to assets, tax receipts, credit lines or the 
issue of currency/reserves must be available to the LLR in order to buy assets at prices which the 
market considers unrealistic at the time. As these crises usually involve a shortage of liquidity and the 
central bank creates this, the LLR function is typically assigned to the central bank.    9
further instability because continued fiscal imbalances
17 may force the private banks 
to lend to the government and to those previously relying on liquidity provision, 
which increases their bad loan book and then causes bank runs. A high interest-rate 
treasury bill as an alternative ‘solution’ to the fiscal problem leads to longer-term 
solvency problems and causes the banks to disintermediate.
18   
 
For instance, Berg and Borenszreib (2000) examine the costs and benefits of full 
dollarisation as compared to a currency board, taking Argentina as the test case. The 
benefits include lower international borrowing costs, which they quantify by looking 
at the effect of currency risk on the default risk component of international (ie dollar) 
borrowing costs. The quantified costs are the loss of seignorage (much less than the 
interest rate gain) but the effect of having no easy exit option and the absence of a 
lender of last resort are only discussed qualitatively.
19  They also argue that optimal 
currency area criteria such as convergence with the US economy are not relevant to 
this case. 
For instance from 1996 the monetary authorities in Hong Kong assumed explicit 
responsibility for the provision of LLR facilities to banks experiencing day-to-day 
liquidity shortages. In 1998 banks were given unrestricted access to liquidity through 
repurchase agreements using the Exchange Fund (which holds the Hong Kong foreign 
exchange reserves).
20 However, it should be noted that 90 percent of deposits are 
concentrated in one bank and its subsidiaries; and as this bank was well diversified 
internationally, systemic risk was reduced and the LLR function was implicitly 
provided ‘internally’.  Again, Argentina in the early 1990s strict application of the 
currency board system shifts LLR responsibilities to the private sector (as had been 
the case of Canada before 1935, or indeed Scotland under the free banking system 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).  This was made viable by the fact that 
all but one of the domestic banks were foreign-owned, and could thus rely on its head 
office (or in the last resort, the home country central bank) as LLR. 
 
Finally, there is the case of Panama.  Under treaty arrangements established on 
independence, dollars serve as legal tender and are the only (paper) fiat money.
21  
There is no central bank, money creation or exchange rate or interest rate policy as 
such - the minimal differential reflects the (low) default risk.  The treaty arrangements 
ensure the supply by the US Treasury of fiat money to meet banks’ requirements to 
replace old notes or for cash against deposits in US banks. There is no provision for 
LLR as such, although most banks are foreign affiliates and thus can rely on home 
country facilities. Moreover, in Panama the money supply (deposit money in this 
case) is comparatively small and the banking system has a very strong reserve 
position, as the large dollar inflows were mostly converted into external assets.   
                                                           
17 Which themselves may result from the need to bail out fragile banks by taking over their bad loan 
books. 
18 As Calvo and Veigh (1992) point out 
19 In fact, as mentioned above, Argentina has two lenders of last resort: the Argentine treasury 
borrowing on New York and London, and the foreign banks located in Buenos Aires borrowing from 
their head offices.   
20 The HK authorities also bought up (with the public sector pension fund) a third of the Han Seng to 
provide non-bank liquidity and confidence.  
21 The only other such treaty is with Liberia.   10
Above all, Panama represents no systemic risk to the US economy.
22  The implications 
are two: on the one hand this model requires the core country to assume explicit 
responsibility for fiat money supply; and it is also only viable in small economies 
where the banking system is not heavily committed to the domestic economy – that is, 
in offshore financial centres.  
 
Note that in Panama, the money supply (deposit money in this case) is comparatively 
small: in 1999 ‘deposit money’ (the only type recorded) was US$ 1 bn as opposed to 
$42 bn in Mexico and $1462 in the US. However, the banking system has a very 
strong reserve position (by definition), to match the very low official forex reserves of 
less than $1 bn (Mexico is 32) in 1999. Panamanian interest rates are only 1-2 percent 









4. CONSTRUCTING A CURRENCY ZONE: THE STERLING AREA, THE FRANC ZONE 
AND THE EMU 
 
The heyday of this dollar standard was the nineteen-fifties and sixties, and as the 
dollar was the only reserve currency, it was the rest of the world (RoW) which 
intervened in foreign exchange markets in order to stabilise parities. The RoW held 
their reserves in US Treasury securities rather than Federal Reserve liabilities, which 
implied a passive sterilisation of US payments imbalances, while the RoW was unable 
to sterilise the effects of capital flows on their own money base. In consequence, 
currency substitution out of (into) the dollar raised (lowered) the world’s money base 
as a whole.
23  Significantly, the Bretton Woods system broke down because of the 
costs to the core member (the US) of maintaining the stability of the core currency 
(the dollar) in the face of fiscal deficits.
24  
 
An alternative approach to the use of an external currency in the post-WWII period 
was the arrangement in place between the UK and the Sterling Area participants 
during the 1950s.
25  Post-war arrangements with the aftermath of empire were 
dominated by the desire to retain trading arrangements and the role of sterling as an 
international reserve currency in the face of the ‘dollar shortage’. The UK maintained 
                                                           
22 In 1999 ‘deposit money’ (the only type of money recorded) was US$ 1 billion as opposed to $1462 
bn in the US. However, the banking system has a very strong reserve position (by definition), to match 
the comparatively low official reserves of less than $1 bn in 1999.  
23 McKinnon (1982) supposes that world money demand is a stable function of income but that 
substitution into and out of the dollar is unstable and depends on exchange rate expectations. Under 
these circumstances (an extreme case of the so-called ‘N + 1 Problem’) only the US money base is 
directly controlled; so that of the rest of the world depends on the domestic assets of the Federal 
Reserve.  
24 The parallel with the US current account deficit thirty years later is cause for concern – dollarised 
economies can only hope for a ‘soft landing’.  
25 See Schenk (1994) for a complete account. The members included the Commonwealth (except 
Canada) and related countries in the Middle and Far East. The system effectively came to an end with 
the 1958 devaluation of sterling.   11
capital controls for all payments outside the Sterling Area, whose members kept their 
reserves in London (in sterling) and enforced common currency controls with the UK. 
The sterling balances were liabilities for the UK, of course, and exceeded UK foreign 
exchange reserves (ie dollar balances) by four or five times; although they were to 
some extent matched by UK direct investment (ie fixed assets) in member countries.  
The currency zone was thus underpinned not only by trade flows, but also by capital 
movements.  The system was finally undermined by the desire of members to switch 
to a stronger reserve currency (the dollar) and to lift capital controls on the one hand. 
The relative economic weakness of the ‘central banker’ for the zone (the UK) relative 
to both members and to the rest of the world, was also a key causal factor.   
 
The other post-colonial model, which has survived rather better, is the CFA 
Franc/Euro arrangement in West and Central Africa.
26  The members benefit from a 
fixed exchange rate against the French Franc (now the Euro) which is adjustable in 
consultation with the French authorities. Full convertibility is guaranteed by the 
French Treasury for those currencies emitted by the Bank of Central African States 
and the Bank of West African States respectively.  In turn, these two central banks 
deposit at least 65 percent of their foreign exchange reserves with the French 
Treasury, at market-related yields. As these balances can be both positive (from 
accumulated external earnings and aid transfers) and negative, an automatic 
‘overdraft’ facility is available; but member countries enter into formal commitments 
to limit fiscal deficits.  The key consequence is the unlimited convertibility of the 
CFA Franc into Euros, which is complemented by full cross-convertibility of 
currencies within the zone and free capital movements.  
 
Although the CFA system came under strain with the devaluation of 1994 (after 
various commodity price shocks), leaving a legacy of debt, it has performed well as a 
whole.  One of its shortcomings is that the countries inside the zone do not form an 
optimal currency area between themselves –. The strength of the system is its market 
credibility, which is provided not so much by the backing of the French Treasury 
(which in practice manages to manage the system so that member balances remain 
positive) as the economic and political cost of withdrawal. Although the Euro does 
not appear to circulate as such, it certainly ‘backs’ domestic money in a more 
effective way than a currency board (with no external discipline of LLR) would do – 
while allowing for devaluation in response to a persistent misalignment. The 
equivalent setup in the case of Mexico, would involve the Banxico holding its 
reserves with the Federal Reserve against an overdraft facility and some sort of 
stability pact as ‘operating rules’ as in the CFA. Full convertibility at a fixed (but not 
irrevocable) rate would be ensured in this way.  
 
Early debates on the European Monetary System and Monetary Union were not 
dissimilar to current discussions of dollarisation in the Western Hemisphere. Initial 
expectations were that member countries would not meet the fiscal targets necessary 
nor legislate for the required labour market flexibility.
 27 These were felt to be 
necessary because price stability in the region as a whole would require a strict limit 
on aggregate money supply, and that individual members should not be allowed to 
                                                           
26 Created in 1939 as the Franc des Colonies Francaises d’Afrique, it is now called Franc de la 
Communautee Financiere d’Afrique. It covers 14 African countries. See Hadjimichael and Galy 
(1997). 
27 Hallwood and MacDonald (1994), Chapter 14.   12
borrow directly from the central monetary authority in order to prevent moral hazard. 
In consequence, with unified interest rates the only adjustment mechanism available 
to asymmetric shocks would be labour costs. Given the level of social entitlements 
built into the ‘European Project’ the only option was employment flexibility.  
 
The benefits of monetary unification were held to include: (i) increased allocative 
efficiency due to reduction of exchange rate risk, although shocks might be 
transmitted to the bond market; (ii) risk adjusted interest rates would fall, leading to 
increased investment and growth; (iii) avoidance of overshooting, misalignment of 
exchange rates and currency speculation; (iv) payments can be made in own currency 
rather than in dollars requiring trade surpluses with the US; (v) savings in transactions 
costs estimated at half of one percent of European output; (vi) gains in monetary 
credibility for high inflation countries, above all in Southern Europe; (vi) trade 
promotion effects due to reduced price uncertainty. 
 
The costs of monetary unification were considered to include: (i) the loss of 
adjustment capacity, which depends upon how well demand and supply shocks are 
correlated – it was felt that these were better correlated in US than in EU
28; (ii) built-
in fiscal and wage inflation pressure would force excessive deflation for long time 
after unification; (iii) low wage member countries would attract ‘broadening’ 
investment while high income ones attract ‘deepening’ (high wage and value added) 
investment so that structural subsidies would be necessary to ensure productivity 
convergence; (iv) a single monetary policy would not suit all members due to very 
different financial structures
29; (v) the strong constraints on fiscal policy would be 
politically unsustainable. 
  
The central point in the traditional analysis
30 was that factor mobility is crucial in 
order to keep the real exchange rate steady as well as the nominal parity. The example 
given (of course) is labour mobility, and without wage flexibility, unemployment can 
result. However, the experience of EMU has raised a number of other factors, 
particularly the credibility of exchange rate arrangements and time-inconsistency in 
governments’ fiscal and monetary policy. Countries with similar economic structures 
are held to respond similarly to shocks (whether trade or financial) then symmetrical 
(ie common) responses will be appropriate. If structures are different, then 
disturbances will be asymmetrical and the policy response should be asymmetric too. 
Further, with a dominant economy (eg Germany, or in our case US) in the currency 
area, shocks will be transmitted to the other members (eg to Spain or Mexico) rather 
than the other way around.  
 
Subsequent theoretical advances in the analysis of market expectations on the one 
hand and the experience of fiscal adjustment (the Maastricht Treaty) and the relatively 
smooth introduction on the Euro, have led to a considerable shift in opinion as to the 
relevant criteria.
31 It is clear that members must agree on the monetary policy rules, 
but a problem of credibility remains if the new monetary institutions (i.e. the ECB) 
have no reputation in capital markets.
32 Moreover, if one member is economically 
                                                           
28 Which were also felt to be true to the faster adjustment of non-traded prices in the US. 
29 Which disrupted the EMS in 1992. 
30 E.g. Mundell (1961). 
31 See de Grauw (1992), Danthine, Giavezzi and von Thadden (2000), and  Detken and Hartmann 
(2000).  
32 If the Federal Reserve exercised these functions for a dollar zone, this would not be such a problem.   13
dominant, the transmission of the business cycle to the periphery will be exacerbated 
– particularly if the latter is subject to asymmetric terms of trade shocks.
33 However 
expectations are central to success: the credibility of low inflation cause lower interest 
rates and thus outweigh the increased adjustment costs. The gains to the core 
economy (or economies) are not quite so clear; indeed its own credibility will be 
diminished by its LLR role – or at least the pressure to adapt interest rate policy to the 
broader needs of the zone.  
 
The size of the Euro capital market now approximates that of US.
 34  In fact, European 
monetary unification is about capital market integration as much as fixed exchange 
rates as such: it is profoundly changing the financial structure of Europe.
35 In 
consequence, the direct effects such as the elimination of currency risk foreseen in the 
Ceccini Report
36 are now considered to be less important than the indirect effects such 
as larger bond and equity markets, mergers of banks and stock markets. These in turn 
lead to further pressure to introduce further reforms in order to reduce the cost of 
intra-EU transactions and to increase the depth and liquidity of European financial 
markets. Finally, appropriate regulatory structures are gradually emerging in response 
to these changes, despite the fact that the powers of the European Central Bank were 






5. ASSESSING THE MEXICAN OPTIONS FOR MONETARY INTEGRATION  
 
Although Mexican economy is increasingly integrated to the US economy, their 
business cycles are not highly correlated because of the vulnerability of Mexico to 
repeated financial crises. These in turn are followed by large demand adjustments (as 
in 1983 and 1995) and although trade recovers quickly, investor confidence tends to 
recover much more slowly.  
 
The benefits to Mexico would thus be the reduction of the risk premium, possibly 
towards Canadian levels. This would reduce foreign and domestic borrowing costs 
considerably (Table 3). As Table 5 and Figure 1 suggest, the gains would be very 
large – affecting both fiscal resources and domestic investment levels very positively. 
On government debt alone, a 100 basis point reduction in the dollar yield spread costs 
would be equivalent to a saving of $1 billion a year. Probably as important would be 
the reduction in variability of interest rates and thus in business uncertainty, leading to 
a stimulus to fixed investment and thus competitiveness.   
  
A major concern in European (and other) discussions of currency unification has been 
the seignorage loss, and specifically the cost of replacing the money supply. The net 
                                                           
33 Which in the case of dollarisation would include relative price shifts within the US economy. 
34 Danthine, Giavezzi and von Thadden (2000) 
35 Detken and Hartmann (2000) find that for most market segments, the euro immediately became in 
1999 the second most widely used currency for international financiang and investment. International 
bond and note issuance overtook the dollar in the second half of the year. The investment role of the 
euro is not so dynamic, as most of the early external asset supply of the euro is actually adsorbed by 
euro-area residents. 
36 EC (1990).   14
cost depends on how money supply is interpreted, because reserves are no longer 
necessary. At the simplest level, reserve money in Mexico is equivalent to $20 bn, 
and is backed by $32 bn of official reserves (see Table 1). However, if wider money 
supply M4 in national currency is all a potential liability against Banxico, then this 
has a value of some $200 bn - 5 times reserves. It should also be noted that the large 
net exposure position of the banks is only just balanced by the Banxico reserves. 
Further, there is a short-term government debt rollover of at least $100bn a year 
(which triggered the 1994-5 crisis). In other words, the reserves are collateral for a 
number of different things at the same time. 
 
Unlike in the EMU – and possibly Canadian – cases, seignorage is not really an issue 
here.  $30 billions in reserve money implies $1bn a year in increased money supply in 
real terms for 3 percent GDP growth. This is about 0.2 percent of GDP, and 1 percent 
of fiscal income. However, in terms of the risk premium on foreign borrowing; with 
external debt of government at $ 100 billions, then a reduction of 100 basis points in 
the spread would exceed this cost – while the present spread is of the order of 400 
basis points. In other words, the likely reduction in the risk premium would far 
outweigh the seignorage loss. 
 
Further, as Table 2 indicates, overall Mexican debt has stayed remarkably stable in 
dollar terms at around $100 billions: the main change is the shift from domestic to 
foreign holdings up to 1995; and then the switch back afterwards, so 1999 looks very 
much like 1993. However two thirds of this is held by residents abroad.
37 
  
The 1994-95 peso crisis clearly indicates the importance of the LLR function in 
Mexico. The Mexican banking system was extremely vulnerable, and dollar as well 
as peso liquidity had to be supplied by the national authorities; the latter was not too 
problematic (although pressure for restrictive monetary and fiscal policy difficult) and 
ultimately took the form of the government taking on bank’s bad loan books. Dollar 
liquidity was provided in the event by the US authorities, although without sufficient 




In view of the size of the Mexican economy and financial system, the simple 
‘panamanian’ solution of a currency treaty to allow Mexico to use dollar bills is 
hardly a feasible solution. On the one hand, the Mexican financial system would 
require an enormous capital expenditure (of the order of $200 billion) to convert peso 
into dollar assets; Panama having built these up over nearly a century and in receipt of 
large dollar inflows which were converted into external assets. This contrasts with 
membership of a federal reserve system (when the US authorities would simply 
exchange peso notes for dollar notes at nominal printing cost) or CFA-type system 
where only the external reserves are handed over (with monetary rules) in exchange 
for parity underwriting.  In short, it would require a tripling of Mexican external debt. 
On the other hand, the US authorities would – by allowing use of the dollar- be 
committed not only to supply of currency but also to an implicit support for the 
                                                           
37 Note that in the case of Spain (1998) 25 percent of debt is held by non-residents.  
38 The degree of Federal Reserve concern and involvement is evidenced in the minutes of Federal 
Reserve meetings at the time. See www.bog.frb.fed.us/fomc/Transcripts/1994/940324ConfCall.pdf  
[March 24 conference call on Mexico]; /941220Meeting.pdf [Dec 20 meeting]; /941230ConfCall.pdf  
[Post-crisis emergency conference call on December 30 1994]   15
economy (which could no longer adjust thorough devaluation); and this could not be 
conceded without some control over monetary policy.    
 
This argument, in combination with the high degree of trade and investment 
integration between the US and Mexico, would seem to imply that a dollar equivalent 
to the Euro/CFA area is the logial solution. Moreover, the reserve currency in 
question (the dollar) is fully convertible and the US economy is much stronger in 
relation to Mexico. It is true that the present overvaluation of the dollar and the 
chronic US current account deficit (as well as the recovery prospects of the Euro and 
the Yen) imply a considerable potential for dollar devaluation. However, this would 
not have the same effect on Mexico (or Canada) as it did on Sterling Area members 
because the former are far more integrated with the US economy than the latter were 
with the UK. As in the case of the CFA, the key steps would be three: first, the 
transfer of Mexican reserves to the Federal Reserve or the US Treasury in some 
agreed proportion of the peso money supply; second, the fixing of an exchange rate 
which can be credibly maintained; and third, a commitment by the US authorities to 
maintain the agreed exchange rate. This in turn would require agreement on the 
operating rules for fiscal and monetary policy in Mexico.   
 
Whatever the principles of optimal currency areas might indicate, in view of the 
degree of dollarisation in practice in Mexico, and the extent of US intervention during 
the 1994-95 crisis, a logical step worth examining is that of the Banco de Mexico 
(Banxico) being called upon to assume the functions of the ‘13
th US Federal Reserve 
Bank’.  Membership of the Federal Reserve System includes depository, supervisory 
and government serve functions as well as the contributions to monetary policy (and 
the right to call on other members for liquidity). Examining these functions is 
important because it indicates not only the scope of Fed membership, but also implies 
that if (as is very probable) this does not occur, then the functions will have to be 
taken on by another institution.  
 
The depository function of the member banks include the replacement and circulation 
of fiat money and the management of the reserves required of depository institutions. 
Reserve banks also handle receipts of Treasury funds (eg income tax payments), and 
issue and redeem public debt in various forms. These are functions that the Bank of 
Mexico carries out at the national level ‘in pesos’; and these could also be carried out 
for the Mexican authorities under an integrated monetary system; indeed it could 
carry out similar functions for other US federal agencies.  
 
The supervisory and regulatory functions of reserve banks include the monitoring of 
domestic and foreign banks and bank holding companies in their territory. The 
Banxico doesn’t do this, but the Superintendicia de Bancos does, and the function 
could be transferred. The Superintendencia also regulates securities markets; which 
would require a link with the SEC. Indeed this latter step is probably inevitable 
anyway as most stocks are traded on US markets.  Nonetheless, participation in the 
federal supervisory system (involving information exchange and taking part in the 
drafting of financial regulations) does pose constitutional problems for both countries 
in principle – although in practice the political problem would be greater north of the 
Rio Bravo.   
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The crucial issue is thus the ability of a federal bank to set and influence monetary 
policy. There are two quite different features of this relationship. On the one hand, 
Banxico would lose its own reserves and the ability to set interest rates through open 
market operations, and would be thus unable to help domestic banks in difficulty 
unless the Governors of the Federal Reserve approved of such an action – committing 
the overall ‘pool’ to such support. This would, of course, have far more market 
credibility than at present.   On the other hand, the president of Bancixo would 
presumably serve, in rotation, on the Federal Open Market Committee, which makes 
monetary policy for the US economy as a whole – which would raise important 
constitutional issues (taken up below) but not economic ones.  As we have seen the 
former loss would not be significant, the problem being the latter gain. 
 
Finally, the relative size of the two economies means that the implicit expansion of 
the dollar money supply would not be sufficient to mean that any future Mexican 
difficulties would affect the value of the dollar as such, which would continue to be 
underpinned by the strength of the US economy. The Mexican money supply (see 
appendix) is only equivalent to 3 percent of that of the US; the reserve money ratio is 
similar. 
 
Of course similar considerations apply to Canada. Buiter (1999) considers a North 
American Monetary Union (NAMU) from the point of view of Canada, which 
currently has a flexible and an inflation and looks at (a) the adoption of US $, and (b) 
full monetary union. Transactions costs savings arise with either, but the seignorage 
loss in (a) is more than (b). Macroeconomic stabilisation aspects of permanent fixed 
exchange rate are key to optimal currency area arguments (Mundell, 1961; 
McKinnon, 1963); these effects are equal in (a) and (b). The loss of a lender of last 
resort is the main cost of unilateral dollarisation, which makes (b) better than (a). 
Integration of the capital markets, moreover, eliminates the extraneous instability and 
excess volatility inherent in the market-determined exchange rate.  Buiter argues that 
“on balance the economic argument favours a full, formally symmetric monetary 
union, but not the unilateral adoption of the US dollar” However, “because of the 
absence of any democratic political institutions spanning both Canada and the US, the 







There are three main conclusions arising from this paper. First, that NAFTA trade 
expansion has been much faster than that originally contemplated (or estimated in the 
CGE models), and it cannot be explained by price effects – that is the 1995 
devaluation. Moreover, there has been relatively little progress in intra-industry 
integration. Market integration appears to be proceeding in a more ‘direct’ fashion 
associated with cross-border investment and the process of de facto currency 
substitution. This “winner’s curse” was not contemplated by the architects of 
NAFTA. 
 
Second, the process of currency substitution (‘dolarization’) is difficult to measure but 
clearly marked; affecting not just asset holdings but also the basis for financial 
transactions and price calculations. This currency substitution is part of secular trend   17
reflecting trade integration and capital account liberalisation. It is driven by the 
private sector, and accelerated by exchange rate uncertainty. However, Mexico and 
the US clearly do not meet the usual criteria for a currency area - unlike Canada and 
the US. 
 
Third, the ideal solution might be for the Banco de Mexico to become the ‘thirteenth 
member of the Federal Reserve’ thus for the US authorities to underwrite the 
monetary stability of the Mexican economy. This would be difficult to achieve, 
because of the need for Washington to act as both lender of last resort and financial 
supervisor. There are, however, a number of intermediate solutions – equivalent 
perhaps to the Franc Zone or the Sterling Area – that could perform the necessary 
functions without implying Mexican participation in US monetary policy decisions. 
 
The problem appears to lie in the Federal District rather than in the Distrito Federal. 
The de facto dollarisation on the Mexican economy and the widespread desire for 
monetary stability mean that there almost certainly exists sufficient political support 
for the ceding of legal sovereignty. US public opinion is probably not ready for such 
an option, because of the implications of constructing new cross-border institutions – 




Trade and financial rules and regulatory agencies would have to take into account the 
legitimacy of their Canadian and Mexican counterparts (in essence the European 
‘passport’ system) which would require legislation that would be regarded by 
opponents as having profound constitutional implications. NAFTA harmonisation of 
trade and financial services regulations will eventually require major changes at the 
level of individual US states, if only to prevent regulatory arbitrage and regulatory 
capture: this might be even more politically difficult than changes in Federal 
legislation. In a sense, the US is coming to terms with having neighbours for the first 
time - this does not just require alterations in external economic relations (‘ border 
controls’) but also to internal economic organisation - the fabric of civil society 
itself.
40 
    
In sum, there seems to be an inescapable tension between de facto dollarisation in 
Mexico - and by extension in the Americas - pushed by private sector portfolio 
composition decisions, on the one hand, and the evident drawbacks to de jure 
dollarisation as a government policy on the other. This tension does not just arise 
from the need to retain exchange rate flexibility in order to adsorb external trade 
shocks and respond to shifts in the G3 parities. Dollarisation will not stabilise 
domestic output or bring the Mexican (or Latin American) business cycle into line 
with the US, if historical experience is any guide. An active fiscal policy will be 
necessary to maintain growth and employment, which will in turn require a shift away 
from the current orthodoxy on budgetary balance and flexible access to capital 
markets unencumbered by debt.  
 
Finally, the current debate underestimates the institutional problems of liquidity 
management in response to changes in private sector asset demand. This requires 
                                                           
39 Both the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and Senator Mack (Florida) now support the extension of a 
‘dollar area’ southwards.   
40 See FitzGerald (1999) for further discussion.    18
central banking commitments by the US which is currently unwilling to assume, even 
though it does appear to be prepared to permit the dollarisation of small economies 
such as Ecuador and El Salvador.  This commitment is more likely to arise from 
repeated and cumulative response to emergencies rather than from a considered 
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Table 1  Monetary Survey 
 
Mexico  
  1993 1995 1997 1999 
International Liquidity (US$ bn)      
Official  Reserves  25.1 16.9 28.8 31.8 
Bank  Assets  2.4 3.3 2.9 2.8 
Bank  Liabilities  36.6 44.4 35.2 31.2 
Net  Balance  (9.1) (24.3)  (3.5) 3.4 
      
Monetary Survey (US$ bn 
equivalent) 
    
Reserve  Money  15.2 8.7  13.5 19.8 
Money  Supply  46.3 19.7 33.0 41.6 
Domestic Credit  94.9  67.6  112.7  106.9 
      





  1993 1995 1997 1999 
International Liquidity (US$ bn)      
Official  Reserves  12.5 15.0 17.8 28.1 
Bank  Assets  41.1 64.1 84.4 79.2 
Bank Liabilities  67.2  77.1  109.0  95.6 
Net Balance  13.6  2.0  (6.8)  11.7 
      
Monetary Survey (US$ bn 
equivalent) 
    
Reserve  Money  23.3 23.5 24.2 31.7 
Money Supply  88.8  101.2  119.0  138.6 
Domestic  Credit  383.5 423.7 488.3 485.1 
      





 1993  1995  1997  1999 
International Liquidity (US$ bn)         
Official Reserves  62.3  74.8  58.9  60.5 
Bank Assets  552.3  606.5  791.3  808.8 
Bank Liabilities  828.2  1011.9  1208.1  1264.3 
Net Balance  (213.9)  (330.8)  (357.9)  (395.0) 
 
        
Monetary Survey (US$ bn equivalent)      
Reserve Money  400.2  453.8  513.2  652.4 
Money Supply  1231.0  1220.7  1280.2  1462.1 
Domestic Credit  5026.0  5674.8  6493.7  7693.4 
        
Exchange Rate (per US$)  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Source: IFS   23
Table 2 Mexico: government debt by residence of holder 
 
  1993 1995 1997 1999 
Total govt debt (bn pesos)  318.0  751.6  821.8  1126.2 
Domestic  134.8 155.4 273.7 466.1 
Foreign  183.2 596.2 548.1 660.1 
(foreign  share)  58% 79% 67% 59% 
      
Exchange  rate  3.106 7.643 8.083 9.514 
      




Table 3 Aggregate Money Supply in Mexico 
  
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
M4  (bn  pesos)  580.4  724.2  869.3  1116.2 1405.4 1769.0 2115.6 
National  Currency  527.2 530.3 754.7 985.6 1283.5  1627.0  1971.5 
Foreign  Currency  53.1  193.9 114.6 130.6 121.9 142.0 144.0 
         
Deposit  Rate  15.1 13.3 38.1 24.7 14.7 13.8 9.6 
I n f l a t i o n   R a t e          
Depreciation  rate         
GDP  1256.2 1420.2 1837.0 2503.8 3179.0 3791.2 4622.8 
         
Foreign/total  M4  9%  27%  13%  12%  9%  8%  7% 
M4/GDP  46% 51% 47% 45% 44% 47% 46% 
Real  interest  rate:  peso  prices         
Real  interest  rate:  dollar  prices         
Source: Banxico 




Table 4  Reported Monetary Assets of Mexican Residents 
 
US  $  billions  1993 1997 1999 
    
M4: Domestic currency  169.6  158.8  207.2 
        Foreign currency  17.1  15.1  15.1 
        Total  186.7  173.9  222.4 
    
Liquid claims on US  20.7  36.0  36.0 
     Banks  20.0  35.3  35.1 
     Non-banks  0.7  0.7  0.9 
    
Total monetary assets       
     Pesos  169.6  158.8  207.2 
     Dollars  37.8  50.4  51.2 
     Total  209.4  209.2  258.4 
    
     Dollars/total  18%  24%  20% 
Sources: Banxico and US Treasury   24
 
Table 5 Spreads on ‘Americas’ Bonds in New York 
 
  Jan 2000  Jan 2001 
US Treasury 10 years   6.75  5.14 
Spreads (basis points):     
     Canada (2010)  +28  -19 
     Mexico (global 2010)  +327  +356 
     Brazil (global)  +655  +701 






Figure 1: Mexico Bond Spread 1997-2000  
 
 
 
 